Compendius Maximus

Expanded, in-depth answers from the Catechismus Maximus—detailed theological expositions that unpack the concise teachings of the catechism.

Q3: Who is God?

This answer expands the Catechismus Maximus response to Q3: Who is God?, unpacking all arguments in detail for the Compendius Maximus.

The Self-Existent and Perfect Being

God as Ens Perfectissimum

The foundational understanding of God begins with His nature as ens perfectissimum—the most perfect being. This scholastic formulation, developed extensively in medieval theology, establishes God as the absolute standard of perfection from which all other being derives its meaning and existence. Thomas Aquinas articulates this concept in his Summa Theologica, where he demonstrates that “God is perfect in the highest degree, lacking nothing and having every perfection in the most excellent way.”¹

The concept of ens perfectissimum emerges from the philosophical tradition beginning with Aristotle’s notion of the Prime Mover, developed through Neoplatonic thought, and refined by Christian theologians. Aquinas explains: “The perfection of God is demonstrated from His pure actuality. For a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfections.”² This perfection is not merely comparative but absolute—God does not possess perfection as creatures might possess qualities, but rather God’s essence is perfection itself.

The medieval debates surrounding this concept centered on whether perfection could be understood univocally or analogically when applied to God versus creatures. Duns Scotus argued for univocal predication, maintaining that being (ens) is predicated in the same sense of God and creatures, though with infinite and finite modes respectively. Aquinas, however, insisted on analogical predication, arguing that God’s perfection transcends creaturely categories while remaining genuinely communicable to creation in a limited way.

Divine Aseitas and Self-Existence

Central to God’s perfection is His aseitas—His self-existence or being from Himself (a se). This attribute distinguishes God absolutely from all created beings, which exist ab alio (from another). The Westminster Confession articulates this truth: “There is but one only living and true God, who is infinite in being and perfection, a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions, immutable, immense, eternal, incomprehensible, almighty; most wise, most holy, most free, most absolute.”³

The Scriptural foundation for aseitas appears most clearly in Exodus 3:14, where God reveals Himself to Moses as YHWH—”I AM WHO I AM” (Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh). This divine name, occurring over 6,800 times in the Hebrew Scriptures, signifies God’s absolute, independent existence. The Septuagint translates this as ho ōn (“the Being” or “the One who is”), emphasizing the ontological significance of the divine name.

John Calvin expounds on the theological implications of this revelation: “This name was ordained to distinguish the true God from all false gods, and to teach us that God has His being of Himself and sustains all things by His power. For this reason, Christ applies this name to Himself (John 8:58), showing that He is the eternal God who appeared to the fathers.”⁴ The aseitas of God thus establishes both His transcendence over creation and His sufficiency as the source of all being.

The Biblical Revelation of YHWH

The Tetragrammaton and Divine Self-Disclosure

The revelation of the divine name YHWH in Exodus 3:14 represents the pivotal moment of God’s self-disclosure to His covenant people. The Hebrew text presents God’s response to Moses’ inquiry about His name: “God said to Moses, ‘I AM WHO I AM.’ And he said, ‘Say this to the people of Israel: I AM has sent me to you.'” This declaration establishes the fundamental character of God as the self-existent One whose being is not contingent upon anything external to Himself.

The scholarly analysis of the tetragrammaton reveals its connection to the Hebrew verb hayah (to be), suggesting not merely static existence but dynamic, active being. The Qal imperfect form ehyeh can be understood as “I will be” or “I am becoming,” indicating God’s active presence and ongoing self-revelation throughout history. This interpretation aligns with God’s subsequent promise in Exodus 3:15: “This is my name forever, and thus I am to be remembered throughout all generations.”

The theological significance of YHWH extends beyond mere nomenclature to encompass God’s covenant faithfulness. Hermann Bavinck observes: “The name YHWH… expresses not abstract being but the being of God in His relation to His creatures, especially to His people. It is the name of the God of the covenant, the God of grace and salvation.”⁵ This covenantal dimension of the divine name bridges God’s transcendent self-existence with His immanent engagement in redemptive history.

Psalm 90:2 and Divine Eternality

The transcendence of God over creation finds profound expression in Psalm 90:2: “Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever you had formed the earth and the world, from everlasting to everlasting you are God.” This verse establishes God’s temporal priority and independence from the created order, reinforcing the doctrine of aseitas while introducing the concept of divine eternity.

The Hebrew phrase me-olam ve-ad olam (“from everlasting to everlasting”) signifies not merely endless duration but qualitatively different existence that transcends temporal categories altogether. Augustine of Hippo grapples with this concept in his Confessions: “Your years neither come nor go; whereas ours both come and go, in order that they all may come. Your years stand together, because they do stand; nor are those that are coming expelling those that are going, for they pass not away: but ours shall all be, when they shall no more be.”⁶

The theological implications of divine eternality relate directly to God’s immutability and His relationship to temporal creation. If God exists “from everlasting to everlasting,” His being and character remain constant throughout all temporal change. This understanding counters both ancient philosophical notions of temporal gods and modern process theology’s conception of divine temporality.

Divine Immutabilitas and Transcendence

The Doctrine of Divine Immutability

God’s immutabilitas (immutability) constitutes one of the classical divine attributes, asserting that God is unchangeable in His being, perfections, purposes, and promises. This doctrine finds Scriptural foundation in passages such as Malachi 3:6 (“For I the LORD do not change; therefore you, O children of Jacob, are not consumed”) and James 1:17 (“Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change”).

Thomas Aquinas provides the systematic theological foundation for divine immutability in his Summa Theologica: “God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality… But everything which is in any way changed is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable.”⁷

The philosophical argumentation for immutability proceeds from the principle that change implies either improvement or deterioration. Since God is perfect (ens perfectissimum), He cannot improve, as this would imply prior imperfection. Neither can He deteriorate, as this would contradict His perfection. Therefore, God must be immutable in His essential being and attributes.

The Reformed tradition has particularly emphasized divine immutability as foundational to the reliability of God’s promises and the security of salvation. The Westminster Shorter Catechism declares: “God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.”⁸ This formulation connects immutability to all divine attributes, ensuring that God’s character provides an unchanging foundation for human trust and worship.

Contemporary Challenges to Immutability

Modern theology has witnessed significant challenges to the classical doctrine of divine immutability, particularly from process theology and open theism. Process theologians like Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne argue that genuine relationship requires mutual change and that an immutable God cannot truly interact with a changing world. Hartshorne contends: “The ultimate metaphysical truth is creativity, and God is its chief exemplification, not its exception.”⁹

Open theists, including Clark Pinnock and John Sanders, challenge immutability on biblical grounds, citing passages that describe God as changing His mind or responding to human actions. They argue that divine immutability, as traditionally conceived, undermines genuine divine-human relationship and reduces God to a static, impersonal absolute.

Classical theists respond by distinguishing between God’s essential immutability and His relational activity. They maintain that while God’s being and character remain unchangeable, He can enter into genuine relationships with creatures without compromising His perfection. This distinction preserves both divine transcendence and immanence, allowing for authentic divine-human interaction within the framework of classical theism.

Trinitarian Orthodoxy and Homoousios

The Foundation of Trinitarian Doctrine

The doctrine of the Trinity represents Christianity’s distinctive understanding of God’s nature as revealed in Scripture. The Trinitarian formula emerges from the convergence of three biblical truths: the unity of God (monotheism), the deity of Christ, and the personality of the Holy Spirit. This convergence finds its most explicit expression in the Great Commission: “Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit” (Matthew 28:19).

The development of Trinitarian orthodoxy required centuries of theological reflection and conciliar definition. The Council of Nicaea (325 AD) addressed the Arian controversy by affirming that the Son is homoousios (of one substance) with the Father. The Nicene Creed declares: “We believe in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the Father, the only-begotten; that is, of the essence of the Father, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father.”¹⁰

The term homoousios became central to orthodox Trinitarian theology, distinguishing the Christian understanding from both subordinationist heresies (which denied the full deity of the Son) and modalist heresies (which denied real distinctions within the Godhead). Athanasius of Alexandria defended this terminology against Arian objections: “The Son is not a creature but truly God, of one essence with the Father. For if He were a creature, He could not unite us to God, since He Himself would need another to unite Him to God.”¹¹

Biblical Foundations: John 1:1 and John 10:30

The Gospel of John provides crucial biblical foundation for Trinitarian orthodoxy, particularly in its presentation of Christ’s divine identity. John 1:1 declares: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.” This verse establishes both the eternal existence of the Logos and His divine nature, while maintaining His distinct personal relationship with God the Father.

The Greek construction of John 1:1 has been the subject of extensive theological and linguistic analysis. The phrase theos ēn ho logos (the Word was God) employs an anarthrous predicate nominative (theos without the definite article), which in Greek indicates qualitative identity rather than numerical identity. This construction affirms that the Word possesses the nature or essence of deity while maintaining personal distinction from the Father.

John 10:30 provides another foundational text: “I and the Father are one” (egō kai ho patēr hen esmen). The use of the neuter hen (one) rather than the masculine heis indicates unity of essence or nature rather than personal identity. Jesus claims essential unity with the Father while maintaining personal distinction, a claim the Jewish leaders correctly understood as a declaration of deity (John 10:33).

The theological implications of these passages extend beyond mere proof-texting to establish the fundamental structure of Trinitarian theology. They demonstrate that the one God of Scripture exists in personal relationships within His own being, challenging both unitarian monotheism and tritheistic polytheism.

Divine Perichoresis and Relational Being

The Concept of Mutual Indwelling

The doctrine of perichoresis (mutual indwelling or interpenetration) provides the theological framework for understanding how the three persons of the Trinity maintain both their distinct identities and their essential unity. This concept, developed by the Cappadocian Fathers and refined by John of Damascus, describes the intimate, mutual indwelling of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit within the divine essence.

John of Damascus articulates this doctrine in his Exposition of the Orthodox Faith: “The three hypostases are in one another, not so as to be confounded, but so as to cleave to one another, and they have their being in each other without any coalescence or commingling. Nor is it that the Son is in the Father in one way and in the Spirit in another; but in the same way is He in both, and in the same way is the Spirit in the Father and the Son.”¹²

The theological significance of perichoresis lies in its ability to maintain both unity and distinction within the Trinity. Unlike philosophical concepts of unity that require the absorption or elimination of distinctions, perichoresis describes a unity that actually enhances and perfects the distinct identities of the three persons. This mutual indwelling constitutes the very life of God as relational being.

Contemporary Trinitarian theology has increasingly emphasized the relational character of God’s being, moving beyond mere discussions of abstract attributes to explore the implications of divine relationality for understanding both God’s inner life and His relationship with creation. Theologians like Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg have developed “social” models of the Trinity that emphasize the communal nature of divine existence.

The Eternal Relations of Origin

Classical Trinitarian theology describes the eternal relations within the Trinity through the concepts of generation and procession. The Father eternally generates the Son, and the Holy Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father (and, according to Western theology, from the Son as well—the filioque controversy). These relations constitute the personal properties that distinguish the three persons while maintaining their essential unity.

Augustine of Hippo provides the foundational Western understanding of these relations in his De Trinitate: “In God there are no accidents, but only substance and relation. Therefore, whatever is said of God is said either according to substance or according to relation. According to substance He is called God, great, good, wise, and whatever else; according to relation He is called Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.”¹³

The eternal generation of the Son has been a particular focus of theological reflection. This doctrine maintains that the Son’s sonship is not merely economic (pertaining to His role in salvation) but ontological (pertaining to His eternal being). The Son is eternally begotten of the Father, sharing the Father’s essence while maintaining His distinct personal identity. This generation is eternal, not temporal—there was never a time when the Son was not.

The procession of the Holy Spirit presents additional theological complexities, particularly regarding the filioque clause. Western theology, following Augustine, teaches that the Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son, while Eastern theology maintains that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, through the Son. This difference contributed to the eventual schism between Eastern and Western Christianity and continues to influence ecumenical discussions today.

The Attributa Divina: Classical Divine Attributes

Divine Omnipotence as Pantokrator

The omnipotence of God, described in Scripture as pantokrator (all-powerful or ruler of all), represents His unlimited power and sovereign authority over all creation. Revelation 19:6 declares: “Hallelujah! For the Lord our God the Almighty (pantokrator) reigns.” This attribute encompasses both God’s inherent power and His active exercise of that power in creation, providence, and redemption.

Thomas Aquinas provides the systematic theological framework for understanding divine omnipotence: “God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of saying a thing is possible or impossible… For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, impossible if it is incompatible.”¹⁴

The classical understanding of omnipotence does not mean that God can do absolutely anything without logical constraints. Rather, God’s omnipotence means He can accomplish all that is consistent with His nature and logically coherent. God cannot lie (Titus 1:2), cannot deny Himself (2 Timothy 2:13), and cannot create logical contradictions (such as square circles or married bachelors). These are not limitations on God’s power but rather expressions of His perfect rationality and moral character.

Contemporary discussions of divine omnipotence have focused on the so-called “paradox of the stone”—can God create a stone so heavy that He cannot lift it? Classical theists respond by distinguishing between logical possibility and mere verbal formulation. The question contains a logical contradiction and therefore does not represent a genuine possibility that omnipotence should be expected to accomplish.

Divine Omniscience as Pansophia

God’s omniscience (pansophia—all-knowing) encompasses His perfect and complete knowledge of all things actual and possible. Psalm 147:5 declares: “Great is our Lord, and abundant in power; his understanding is beyond measure.” This attribute includes God’s knowledge of past, present, and future events, as well as His knowledge of all possible worlds and hypothetical scenarios.

The theological development of omniscience doctrine has addressed various philosophical challenges, particularly regarding the relationship between divine foreknowledge and human freedom. If God knows the future infallibly, how can human actions be genuinely free? This question generated extensive debate between different schools of thought within Christian theology.

Luis de Molina developed the concept of “middle knowledge” (scientia media) to address this challenge. According to Molinism, God possesses three types of knowledge: natural knowledge (knowledge of all possibilities), middle knowledge (knowledge of what any free creature would freely choose in any given circumstances), and free knowledge (knowledge of what actually will occur based on God’s decree). This framework attempts to preserve both divine sovereignty and human freedom.

Reformed theology, following John Calvin and later systematized by theologians like Francis Turretin, maintains that God’s foreknowledge is based on His eternal decree. God knows the future because He has ordained it, not merely because He observes it. Calvin writes: “We call predestination God’s eternal decree, by which He compacted with Himself what He willed to become of each man… Eternal life is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for others.”¹⁵

Open theism presents a contemporary challenge to classical omniscience, arguing that exhaustive divine foreknowledge is incompatible with genuine human freedom and authentic relationship. Open theists like Gregory Boyd contend that God knows all that can be known, but the future free actions of creatures are not objects of knowledge until they are actualized.

Divine Holiness as Qadosh

The holiness of God (qadosh in Hebrew) represents perhaps the most central and comprehensive of all divine attributes. Isaiah 6:3 records the seraphim’s cry: “Holy, holy, holy is the LORD of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory!” The threefold repetition emphasizes the absolute and perfect nature of God’s holiness, while the Hebrew term qadosh signifies both separation and moral perfection.

Rudolf Otto’s influential work The Idea of the Holy analyzes the concept of holiness as the mysterium tremendum et fascinans—the mystery that is both awesome and attractive. Otto argues that holiness represents the essential character of the divine that evokes both fear and fascination in human experience. While Otto’s phenomenological approach has been critiqued for its emphasis on religious experience over biblical revelation, his analysis highlights the transcendent quality of divine holiness.

The biblical understanding of divine holiness encompasses both God’s transcendent separation from creation and His moral perfection. God’s holiness is not merely one attribute among others but rather the fundamental quality that characterizes all His attributes. His love is holy love, His justice is holy justice, and His wrath is holy wrath. This understanding prevents any sentimentalization of divine love or any conception of divine attributes as potentially in conflict with one another.

The practical implications of divine holiness extend to God’s requirements for His people. The repeated biblical command “You shall be holy, for I am holy” (Leviticus 11:44, 1 Peter 1:16) establishes the ethical implications of God’s character for human conduct. Divine holiness thus serves both as the standard for moral evaluation and as the goal of Christian sanctification.

Divine Simplicitas and the Unity of God

The Doctrine of Divine Simplicity

The doctrine of divine simplicity (simplicitas) maintains that God is not composed of parts but is absolutely simple in His being. This doctrine, foundational to classical theism, asserts that God does not have attributes but rather is His attributes—God does not have goodness, love, or justice, but rather God is goodness itself, love itself, and justice itself. Deuteronomy 6:4 provides the biblical foundation: “Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God, the LORD is one.”

Thomas Aquinas provides the most systematic development of divine simplicity in his Summa Theologica: “God is not a body… God is not composed of matter and form… In God there is no composition of quiddity, or essence, and existence… God is not composed of genus and difference… In God there is no composition of subject and accident… God is in no way composite, but is altogether simple.”¹⁶

The philosophical arguments for divine simplicity proceed from the principle that composition implies dependence and potentiality. If God were composed of parts, He would depend on those parts for His existence and would therefore not be the absolutely independent being required by aseitas. Furthermore, composition implies the potential for change as parts could be rearranged or altered, contradicting divine immutability.

The theological implications of divine simplicity are far-reaching. If God is absolutely simple, then all divine attributes are identical with the divine essence and with each other. This means that God’s love is identical with His justice, His mercy with His holiness, and His omnipotence with His omniscience. This doctrine prevents any conception of internal tension or conflict within God’s character while maintaining the reality of distinct attributes as they relate to creation.

Contemporary Challenges and Defenses

Modern theology has witnessed significant criticism of the doctrine of divine simplicity, with critics arguing that it reduces God to an impersonal absolute and makes meaningful discourse about divine attributes impossible. Alvin Plantinga argues that divine simplicity is “difficult to understand and even more difficult to accept,” particularly in its claim that properties are identical with each other and with God Himself.¹⁷

Process theologians reject divine simplicity as incompatible with their dipolar understanding of God. They argue that a truly relational God must have both abstract and concrete aspects, making simplicity impossible. Charles Hartshorne contends that classical theism’s emphasis on simplicity reflects Greek philosophical influence rather than biblical revelation.

Defenders of divine simplicity, particularly within the Thomistic tradition, respond by distinguishing between God’s simple essence and the multiple ways creatures can participate in or reflect that simplicity. Edward Feser argues that the doctrine of divine simplicity is necessary to maintain God’s status as the ultimate explanation of reality: “If God were composite, then the question would arise of what accounts for the composition, and God would not be the ultimate explanation of things.”¹⁸

The debate over divine simplicity reflects broader questions about the relationship between philosophical theology and biblical revelation, the influence of Greek philosophy on Christian doctrine, and the possibility of meaningful theological language about God’s nature.

Philosophical Arguments for God’s Existence

Anselm’s Ontological Argument

Anselm of Canterbury’s ontological argument represents one of the most influential and controversial philosophical arguments for God’s existence. In his Proslogion, Anselm formulates his argument around the concept of God as id quo maius cogitari nequit (that than which nothing greater can be conceived). The argument proceeds from the definition of God to the necessity of His existence.

Anselm’s original formulation states: “And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist merely in the understanding. For suppose it exists merely in the understanding: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater. Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists merely in the understanding, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.”¹⁹

The ontological argument generated immediate controversy, with Gaunilo of Marmoutiers offering the first significant critique in his “On Behalf of the Fool.” Gaunilo argued that the same logic could prove the existence of a perfect island, reducing the argument to absurdity. Anselm responded by distinguishing between contingent perfections (like islands) and necessary perfection (God alone).

The argument experienced revival in the modern period through philosophers like René Descartes, Gottfried Leibniz, and more recently, Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga’s modal version reformulates the argument using possible worlds semantics: if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then such a being exists in some possible world; if a maximally great being exists in any possible world, then it exists in all possible worlds; therefore, a maximally great being exists in the actual world.

Critics of the ontological argument, including Immanuel Kant, argue that existence is not a predicate that can be included in the concept of something. Kant’s famous critique maintains that “being is obviously not a real predicate” and that the argument illegitimately moves from conceptual analysis to existential claims.²⁰

Aquinas’s Quinque Viae

Thomas Aquinas presents five philosophical demonstrations for God’s existence in his Summa Theologica, known as the quinque viae (five ways). These arguments proceed from observed features of the natural world to the existence of God as their ultimate explanation, reflecting Aquinas’s Aristotelian methodology and his integration of reason and revelation.

The First Way argues from motion or change. Aquinas observes that things in the world are in motion or changing from potentiality to actuality. Since nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality except by something already in actuality, and since infinite regress is impossible, there must be a First Mover, which everyone understands to be God.

The Second Way proceeds from the nature of efficient causation. Everything is caused by another, but infinite regress in efficient causes is impossible. Therefore, there must be a First Efficient Cause, which is God. This argument addresses not merely temporal priority but ontological dependence—the need for a foundational explanation of causal series.

The Third Way argues from possibility and necessity. Contingent beings (those that can exist or not exist) require explanation from something beyond themselves. Since not all beings can be contingent (or nothing would exist), there must be a Necessary Being that accounts for the existence of contingent beings.

The Fourth Way proceeds from degrees of perfection observed in nature. Things possess goodness, truth, and nobility in varying degrees, implying a standard of maximum perfection. This maximum must actually exist as the cause of all lesser perfections, and this is what we call God.

The Fifth Way argues from the governance or design evident in nature. Natural things lacking intelligence appear to act toward specific ends or goals. This directedness requires an intelligent cause, which is God as the designer and governor of all things.

Contemporary philosophers have both defended and criticized Aquinas’s arguments. Defenders like Edward Feser argue that the arguments remain sound when properly understood within their Aristotelian-Thomistic framework. Critics like J.L. Mackie contend that the arguments fail to establish the existence of the God of classical theism and at best prove only a limited designer or first cause.

The Argument from Romans 1:20

The Apostle Paul provides a theological foundation for natural knowledge of God in Romans 1:20: “For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse.” This verse establishes both the possibility and the moral obligation of recognizing God’s existence and character through the created order.

The theological interpretation of this passage involves several key elements. First, Paul asserts that God’s “invisible attributes” (ta aorata autou) are “clearly perceived” (kathoratai) through creation. The passive voice suggests that this perception is not merely the result of human reasoning but involves God’s active self-revelation through the created order.

Second, the specific attributes mentioned—”eternal power and divine nature” (hē te aidios autou dynamis kai theiotēs)—correspond to fundamental aspects of God’s character that philosophical arguments attempt to demonstrate. The “eternal power” relates to arguments for a First Cause or Prime Mover, while “divine nature” encompasses the transcendent qualities that distinguish God from creation.

Third, Paul’s conclusion that people are “without excuse” (eis to einai autous anapologētous) establishes the moral and epistemological significance of natural revelation. This suggests that the failure to acknowledge God is not merely intellectual error but moral rebellion against clearly available truth.

The theological tradition has interpreted Romans 1:20 as supporting the validity of natural theology while maintaining its limitations. John Calvin writes: “There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity… God himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty… Yet believers are taught by experience that this seed which cannot be uprooted is not enough to produce good fruit.”²¹

Theological Errors: Pantheism and Deism

The Challenge of Pantheism

Pantheism represents a fundamental distortion of the biblical understanding of God by identifying God with the totality of the universe (theos = kosmos). This position, found in various forms throughout history, collapses the distinction between Creator and creation, making God immanent to the point of losing all transcendence. Classical pantheism, as developed by philosophers like Baruch Spinoza, maintains that God and nature are identical—Deus sive Natura (God or Nature).

Spinoza’s Ethics presents the most systematic philosophical development of pantheism: “By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence… Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.”²² This formulation eliminates any real distinction between divine and natural causation, making all events necessary expressions of divine nature.

The theological problems with pantheism are numerous and severe. First, pantheism undermines the biblical doctrine of creation ex nihilo. If God is identical with the universe, then creation cannot be understood as God’s free act of bringing something into existence from nothing. Instead, the universe becomes an eternal emanation or expression of divine being, contradicting the clear biblical testimony to temporal creation (Genesis 1:1).

Second, pantheism eliminates the possibility of genuine divine action in history. If God is identical with natural processes, then special divine interventions, miracles, and particular revelations become impossible. The biblical narrative of God’s mighty acts in history—the Exodus, the Incarnation, the Resurrection—cannot be maintained within a pantheistic framework.

Third, pantheism creates insurmountable moral problems. If everything is God, then evil must be divine, contradicting the biblical affirmation of God’s perfect holiness. The problem becomes acute when considering moral responsibility—if human actions are simply expressions of divine nature, then moral evaluation becomes meaningless.

Christian theology has consistently rejected pantheism while affirming both divine transcendence and immanence. The biblical God is transcendent (beyond and independent of creation) yet immanent (present and active within creation). This position, sometimes called “panentheism” when carefully defined, maintains that while God is present in all things, He is not identical with all things.

The Inadequacy of Deism

Deism presents the opposite error to pantheism by so emphasizing God’s transcendence that His immanence is effectively denied. Classical deism, prominent during the Enlightenment period, portrays God as a cosmic clockmaker who created the universe with natural laws and then withdrew from active involvement in its operation. This view severs God’s proximum (nearness) to creation, contradicting the biblical testimony to God’s ongoing providence and particular care for His creation.

The deistic understanding emerged from Enlightenment rationalism and the desire to maintain belief in God while avoiding what were perceived as the superstitious elements of traditional Christianity. Deists like Voltaire and Thomas Paine argued for a rational religion based on natural revelation alone, rejecting special revelation, miracles, and divine intervention in human affairs.

Voltaire articulates the deistic position: “I believe in God, not the God of the mystics and the theologians, but the God of nature, the great geometrician, the architect of the universe, the prime mover, unalterable, immutable, neither loving nor hating, neither answering prayers nor cursing.”²³ This conception reduces God to a philosophical principle rather than the personal, covenant-making God of Scripture.

The biblical witness directly contradicts deistic assumptions by presenting God as actively involved in creation and history. Jeremiah 23:23-24 declares: “‘Am I a God at hand, declares the LORD, and not a God far away? Can a man hide himself in secret places so that I cannot see him? declares the LORD. Do I not fill heaven and earth? declares the LORD.'” This passage affirms both God’s transcendence (“far away”) and His immanence (“at hand,” “fill heaven and earth”).

The theological problems with deism include its denial of divine providence, its rejection of special revelation, and its reduction of God to an impersonal first cause. Deism cannot account for the biblical testimony to God’s particular care for His people, His responses to prayer, or His redemptive work in history. The God of deism is not the God who walks with Adam in the garden, calls Abraham to covenant relationship, delivers Israel from Egypt, or becomes incarnate in Jesus Christ.

Reformed theology has particularly emphasized God’s providence as the antidote to deistic thinking. The Westminster Confession declares: “God the great Creator of all things does uphold, direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, actions, and things, from the greatest even to the least, by His most wise and holy providence.”²⁴ This doctrine maintains that God’s transcendence enables rather than prevents His intimate involvement with creation.

Karl Barth’s Ganz Anders and Divine Transcendence

Barth’s Theological Revolution

Karl Barth’s concept of God as ganz Anders (wholly other) represents a significant theological development in twentieth-century Protestant theology. Barth’s dialectical theology emerged as a reaction against nineteenth-century liberal theology’s tendency to domesticate God within human categories and natural theology’s confidence in human reason’s ability to know God apart from revelation.

Barth’s Commentary on Romans introduced his revolutionary theological perspective: “God is the wholly Other. This is the first and most important thing that must be said about God. He is not an object among objects, not a being among beings, not even the highest being, but the being beyond all beings, the reality that determines all reality while being determined by none.”²⁵ This emphasis on divine otherness sought to restore a proper sense of God’s transcendence and the infinite qualitative distinction between God and humanity.

The theological implications of Barth’s ganz Anders extend beyond mere emphasis on transcendence to encompass his entire theological methodology. Barth rejected natural theology and the analogia entis (analogy of being) in favor of the analogia fidei (analogy of faith), arguing that God can be known only through His self-revelation in Jesus Christ. This position led to his famous conflict with Emil Brunner over the possibility of natural knowledge of God.

Barth’s concept of divine otherness serves as a safeguard against anthropomorphism—the tendency to conceive of God in merely human terms. By emphasizing God’s qualitative distinction from creation, Barth sought to preserve the mystery and majesty of God while maintaining the possibility of genuine revelation. God’s otherness does not make Him unknowable but rather ensures that any knowledge of God must come through His gracious self-disclosure.

The influence of Barth’s theology extends far beyond his immediate context to shape contemporary discussions of divine transcendence, the relationship between reason and revelation, and the possibility of natural theology. His emphasis on God’s otherness has been both praised for restoring a proper sense of divine majesty and criticized for potentially making God so transcendent as to be practically irrelevant to human experience.

Critiques and Developments

Barth’s concept of God as wholly other has faced significant theological criticism from various perspectives. Catholic theologians like Hans Urs von Balthasar have argued that Barth’s rejection of the analogia entis leads to an inadequate understanding of the relationship between nature and grace. Protestant theologians like Wolfhart Pannenberg have contended that Barth’s position makes genuine dialogue between theology and other disciplines impossible.

The criticism of Barth’s position often focuses on its implications for natural theology and general revelation. Critics argue that if God is so wholly other that He cannot be known through creation and reason, then Romans 1:20 and the broader biblical testimony to natural revelation become meaningless. Furthermore, the complete rejection of natural theology may lead to fideism—the view that faith has no rational foundation.

Defenders of Barth’s position respond that the concept of ganz Anders does not eliminate the possibility of knowing God but rather ensures that such knowledge comes through God’s initiative rather than human achievement. They argue that natural theology, as traditionally conceived, compromises the gratuity of revelation and reduces God to a projection of human religious consciousness.

The development of Barth’s theology throughout his career shows some modification of his earlier radical position. In his later Church Dogmatics, Barth develops a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between revelation and reason, though he maintains his fundamental rejection of independent natural theology.

Christological Revelation and Divine Knowability

Christ as the Hypostasis of Divine Revelation

The tension between divine transcendence and knowability finds its resolution in the person of Jesus Christ, who as the divine hypostasis (person) makes the invisible God visible. Hebrews 1:3 declares that Christ is “the radiance of the glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature” (charaktēr tēs hypostaseōs autou). This verse establishes Christ as both the perfect revelation of God’s character and the means by which the transcendent God becomes knowable to human beings.

The theological concept of hypostasis in this context refers to the underlying reality or essential nature of God that finds perfect expression in the person of Christ. The term charaktēr (exact imprint) suggests not merely resemblance but perfect correspondence—Christ is the exact representation of God’s essential being. This understanding bridges the gap between divine transcendence and human knowledge by asserting that God has made Himself known in the most direct and personal way possible.

The Christological solution to the problem of divine knowability avoids both the errors of natural theology (which claims independent access to God through reason) and theological agnosticism (which denies the possibility of knowing God at all). Instead, it maintains that God is knowable precisely because He has chosen to reveal Himself in the person of His Son.

John Calvin articulates this understanding in his Institutes: “The Word of God is not to be sought in the uncertainty of speculation, but we must be content with what the Lord has revealed in His Christ, who is the image of the invisible God. In Christ we have the perfect knowledge of God, as much as is necessary for our salvation and as much as our minds can bear.”²⁶

The implications of Christological revelation extend beyond epistemology to encompass the entire structure of Christian theology. If Christ is the perfect revelation of God, then all theological reflection must be Christocentric. This principle provides both the foundation and the criterion for evaluating theological claims—they must be consistent with the character of God as revealed in Jesus Christ.

The Johannine Prologue and Divine Self-Disclosure

The Gospel of John’s prologue (John 1:1-18) provides the most comprehensive New Testament treatment of Christ as divine revelation. The passage begins with the eternal existence of the Logos and culminates in the assertion that “No one has ever seen God; the only God, who is at the Father’s side, he has made him known” (John 1:18). This structure demonstrates the movement from divine transcendence to divine self-disclosure in the Incarnation.

The term logos in John’s prologue draws from both Jewish and Hellenistic backgrounds while transcending both. In Jewish thought, the Word of God represents His active presence and creative power. In Hellenistic philosophy, the logos signifies the rational principle underlying the cosmos. John’s usage encompasses both meanings while asserting the personal nature of the divine Word—the logos is not merely God’s attribute or cosmic principle but God’s own self in personal relationship.

The climactic statement of John 1:14—”And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, and we have seen his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father, full of grace and truth”—represents one of the most profound theological assertions in Scripture. The verb egeneto (became) indicates a genuine assumption of human nature without the abandonment of divine nature. The phrase eskēnōsen en hēmin (dwelt among us) literally means “tabernacled among us,” connecting Christ’s presence to the Old Testament theme of God’s dwelling with His people.

The theological implications of the Johannine prologue for understanding divine knowability are decisive. The transcendent God who cannot be directly seen or comprehended has made Himself known through the Incarnation. This revelation is not merely propositional but personal—God reveals Himself not just through information about Himself but through the presentation of Himself in the person of His Son.

Contemporary Theological Disputes

Open Theism and Divine Immutabilitas

Open theism represents one of the most significant contemporary challenges to classical theism’s understanding of divine immutability. Open theists, including Clark Pinnock, John Sanders, and Gregory Boyd, argue that genuine relationship between God and human beings requires divine responsiveness and change. They contend that the classical doctrine of immutability, derived from Greek philosophical influence, contradicts the biblical portrayal of God as dynamic and interactive.

The open theist argument typically proceeds from biblical passages that describe God as changing His mind or responding to human actions. Genesis 6:6 states that “the LORD regretted that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him to his heart.” Open theists argue that such passages must be taken at face value rather than explained away through classical doctrines of immutability and timelessness.

Gregory Boyd articulates the open theist position: “If love is self-sacrificial commitment to another for their good, then God’s love must involve genuine risk and vulnerability. A God who cannot be affected by His creatures, who cannot suffer or change in response to their actions, cannot genuinely love them.”²⁷ This argument connects divine mutability to the authenticity of divine love and the reality of divine-human relationship.

Open theists also challenge the classical understanding of divine foreknowledge, arguing that exhaustive knowledge of future free actions is logically impossible. If human actions are genuinely free, they argue, then even God cannot know them with certainty until they are actualized. This position attempts to preserve both divine omniscience (God knows all that can be known) and human freedom (future free actions are not yet determinate objects of knowledge).

Classical theists respond to open theism by distinguishing between God’s essential immutability and His relational activity. They argue that God can enter into genuine relationships with creatures without changing in His essential being or character. The anthropomorphic language of Scripture (describing God as repenting or changing His mind) is understood as accommodated language that describes the effects of God’s unchanging character in changing circumstances.

The classical response also emphasizes the implications of divine perfection for immutability. If God is perfectly good, wise, and powerful, any change would necessarily be either improvement (implying prior imperfection) or deterioration (implying loss of perfection). Since both alternatives contradict divine perfection, God must be immutable in His essential being.

James 1:17 provides crucial biblical support for the classical position: “Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change.” The phrase “no variation or shadow due to change” (ouk eni parallaxē ē tropēs aposkiasma) uses astronomical imagery to describe God’s absolute constancy in contrast to the changing celestial bodies.

Process Theology and Divine Aseitas

Process theology, developed by Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, presents a systematic alternative to classical theism that directly challenges the doctrine of divine aseitas. Process theologians argue for a dipolar understanding of God, distinguishing between God’s abstract essence (eternal and unchanging) and His concrete actuality (temporal and changing). This view denies that God is self-existent in the classical sense, making God dependent on the world for His concrete experiences and development.

Whitehead’s Process and Reality articulates the foundational principles of process theology: “God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification.”²⁸ This statement reflects process theology’s commitment to making God subject to the same metaphysical principles that govern all reality, rejecting the classical notion of God as actus purus (pure act) without potentiality.

The process understanding of God involves several key modifications to classical theism. First, God is temporal rather than eternal, experiencing succession and development like all actual entities. Second, God is dependent on the world for His concrete experiences, making Him genuinely affected by and responsive to creaturely actions. Third, God’s power is persuasive rather than coercive, working through attraction and lure rather than deterministic control.

Charles Hartshorne develops the implications of dipolar theism: “God is indeed in all respects perfect, but this means that He is perfectly responsive to all that happens, perfectly sympathetic, perfectly faithful to His supreme function of coordinating and preserving all achievements of value.”²⁹ This conception emphasizes divine relativity and mutual dependence between God and world.

Classical theists respond to process theology by defending the necessity of divine aseitas for maintaining God’s status as the ultimate ground of being. If God depends on the world for His concrete actuality, then God cannot serve as the ultimate explanation for the world’s existence. The cosmological argument requires a being that is ontologically independent of the world it explains.

The biblical doctrine of creation ex nihilo also contradicts process theology’s understanding of divine-world relationship. Genesis 1:1 asserts: “In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth.” This statement implies God’s prior existence and independence from creation, supporting the classical doctrine of aseitas against process modifications.

Furthermore, the biblical testimony to God’s sovereignty and transcendence contradicts process theology’s emphasis on divine relativity and dependence. Isaiah 46:9-10 declares: “I am God, and there is no other; I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times things not yet done, saying, ‘My counsel shall stand, and I will accomplish all my purpose.'” This passage affirms God’s absolute sovereignty and independence from creaturely actions.

Trinitarian Heresies: Modalism and Tritheism

The Modalist Challenge to Trinitarian Distinctions

Modalism represents one of the earliest and most persistent challenges to orthodox Trinitarian theology. This heresy, also known as Sabellianism after its most prominent advocate Sabellius, maintains that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not distinct persons but rather different modes or manifestations of the one God. Modalists argue that God appears successively as Father in creation, Son in redemption, and Holy Spirit in sanctification, but these are merely different roles or masks (prosōpa) of the same divine person.

The modalist position emerged in the second and third centuries as an attempt to preserve strict monotheism while acknowledging the divinity of Christ and the Holy Spirit. Modalists argued that Trinitarian language, if taken to imply real personal distinctions, would necessarily lead to tritheism. Their solution was to interpret Trinitarian terminology as referring to different aspects or functions of the one divine person rather than distinct persons within the one divine essence.

Sabellius taught that God is a single hypostasis (person) who manifests Himself in three different prosōpa (faces or roles). In this understanding, when Jesus prays to the Father, He is not engaging in interpersonal dialogue within the Trinity but rather expressing the distinction between His human and divine natures. The Holy Spirit is not a distinct person proceeding from the Father and Son but rather the mode in which the one God operates in the church and individual believers.

The theological problems with modalism are numerous and severe. First, modalism contradicts the clear biblical testimony to simultaneous interaction between the persons of the Trinity. At Jesus’ baptism, the Father speaks from heaven, the Son is baptized, and the Holy Spirit descends like a dove (Matthew 3:16-17). This simultaneous presence of all three persons cannot be explained by successive manifestations of one person.

Second, modalism undermines the reality of the Incarnation and Atonement. If the Son is merely a mode of the Father, then the Father suffered and died on the cross (patripassianism), contradicting the biblical testimony to the Father’s immutability and the Son’s distinct role as mediator. The soteriological implications are devastating—if the Son is not genuinely distinct from the Father, then there is no real mediation between God and humanity.

Third, modalism eliminates the eternal relationships within the Trinity that constitute the foundation of divine love. John 17:24 speaks of the Father’s love for the Son “before the foundation of the world.” If the Father and Son are merely modes of one person, then this eternal love becomes meaningless, reducing God’s love to a temporal attribute rather than an eternal characteristic of His triune being.

The orthodox response to modalism emphasizes the biblical testimony to real personal distinctions within the Trinity while maintaining the unity of the divine essence. The Council of Constantinople (381 AD) affirmed that the three persons are “distinct but not separate, united but not confused.” This formulation preserves both the personal relationships within the Trinity and the essential unity of the Godhead.

Tritheism and the Unity of Divine Essence

Tritheism represents the opposite error to modalism by so emphasizing the distinctions between the persons of the Trinity that the unity of the divine essence is compromised or denied. Tritheists argue that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three distinct divine beings who share divine attributes but do not constitute one God in the strict sense. This position effectively transforms Christianity into a form of polytheism, contradicting the fundamental biblical commitment to monotheism.

Historical tritheism emerged in various forms throughout church history, often as an overreaction to modalist tendencies. Some forms of tritheism maintained that the three persons are three distinct gods who cooperate so closely that they function as one God. Other forms argued that the three persons share a common divine nature but exist as separate individuals, similar to how three human beings share human nature while remaining distinct persons.

The sixth-century philosopher John Philoponus developed a sophisticated form of tritheism that argued for three partial substances united in one complete substance. According to Philoponus, each person of the Trinity possesses a distinct individual essence while sharing in the common divine essence. This position attempts to preserve both personal distinctions and essential unity but effectively results in four essences (three individual and one common) rather than the simple unity required by classical theism.

Contemporary forms of tritheism sometimes emerge from misunderstandings of social Trinitarian models. Some theologians, in their enthusiasm for emphasizing the relational character of the Trinity, describe the three persons in ways that suggest three distinct centers of consciousness and will. When taken to its logical conclusion, this approach can lead to tritheistic implications, though most social Trinitarians explicitly reject tritheism.

The biblical evidence against tritheism begins with the fundamental Old Testament affirmation of monotheism. Deuteronomy 6:4 declares: “Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God, the LORD is one.” The Hebrew word echad (one) signifies not merely unity of purpose but numerical oneness. This foundational confession cannot be reconciled with any form of tritheism that posits three distinct divine beings.

The New Testament maintains this monotheistic commitment while revealing the Trinitarian character of God. 1 Corinthians 8:6 states: “Yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist.” This passage affirms both the unity of God and the distinct roles of Father and Son within that unity.

The orthodox response to tritheism emphasizes the doctrine of homoousios (same essence) established at the Council of Nicaea. This doctrine maintains that the three persons of the Trinity share numerically the same divine essence, not merely similar divine attributes. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three instances of divinity but three persons of the one divine essence.

The Problem of Evil and Divine Attributes

The Challenge of Malum to Divine Omnibenevolentia

The problem of evil (malum) presents one of the most persistent challenges to belief in God, particularly the God of classical theism who is described as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. The logical formulation of the problem argues that the coexistence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good God with the reality of evil is contradictory. If God has the power to prevent evil, the knowledge to foresee it, and the goodness to desire its elimination, why does evil exist?

Epicurus first articulated this challenge in antiquity: “Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?”³⁰ This formulation captures the apparent logical inconsistency between divine perfection and the reality of evil.

The problem of evil takes two primary forms: the logical problem and the evidential problem. The logical problem argues that the existence of any evil whatsoever is logically incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God. The evidential problem acknowledges that some evil might be compatible with God’s existence but argues that the amount and intensity of evil in the world makes God’s existence highly improbable.

Theodicy, the theological discipline that attempts to “justify the ways of God to man,” has developed various responses to the problem of evil. The free will defense, most prominently developed by Alvin Plantinga, argues that God’s creation of free creatures necessarily involves the possibility of evil. If genuine freedom requires the ability to choose between good and evil, then God cannot guarantee that free creatures will always choose good without eliminating their freedom.

Plantinga’s free will defense distinguishes between moral evil (caused by free creaturely choices) and natural evil (caused by natural disasters, disease, etc.). For moral evil, the defense argues that free will is sufficiently valuable to justify God’s permission of its misuse. For natural evil, the defense sometimes appeals to the possibility of non-human free agents (demons) or to the interconnectedness of natural systems that make localized divine intervention problematic.

The soul-making theodicy, developed by John Hick following Irenaeus, argues that the purpose of creation is not to produce a perfect world but to provide an environment for spiritual growth and character development. According to this view, challenges, suffering, and even evil serve as opportunities for moral and spiritual development that would be impossible in a world without struggle.

The Greater Good Defense and Divine Dikaiosyne

The greater good defense maintains that God permits evil because it serves purposes that ultimately result in greater good than would be possible without it. This approach emphasizes God’s comprehensive knowledge and perfect wisdom in ordering all things according to His ultimate purposes. Divine dikaiosyne (righteousness) is understood not as the absence of any connection to evil but as the perfect ordering of all things according to divine justice and mercy.

Augustine of Hippo developed the foundational framework for the greater good defense in his City of God: “For God would never have created any, I do not say angel, but even man, whose future wickedness He foreknew, unless He had equally known to what uses in behalf of the good He could turn him, thus embellishing the course of the ages, as it were an exquisite poem set off with antitheses.”³¹ This approach views evil as serving God’s larger purposes in ways that finite creatures cannot fully comprehend.

The greater good defense typically involves several key components. First, it argues that some goods are “second-order goods” that logically require the existence of evil for their realization. Courage requires danger, compassion requires suffering, and forgiveness requires wrongdoing. A world without any evil would necessarily lack these significant goods.

Second, the defense argues that God’s permission of evil demonstrates His respect for the integrity of the created order. Rather than constantly intervening to prevent every instance of evil, God allows natural processes and free choices to operate according to their own principles. This approach preserves the rationality and predictability of the created order while allowing for genuine creaturely agency.

Third, the defense emphasizes the eschatological dimension of God’s justice. Biblical revelation indicates that God’s final judgment will rectify all injustices and vindicate His righteousness. Romans 8:18 declares: “For I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed to us.” This perspective places temporal evil within the context of eternal justice and redemption.

Critics of the greater good defense argue that it appears to justify any amount of evil by appealing to unknown greater goods. They contend that some evils (particularly intense suffering of innocents) cannot plausibly be justified by any conceivable greater good. Furthermore, they argue that an omnipotent God should be able to achieve any good without permitting evil as a means.

The Resolution in Christ’s Hilasmos

Atonement as the Answer to Theodicy

The ultimate Christian response to the problem of evil is not primarily philosophical but christological. The doctrine of atonement (hilasmos) reveals that God has not remained aloof from the problem of evil but has entered into it personally through the Incarnation and crucifixion of His Son. 1 John 2:2 declares: “He is the propitiation (hilasmos) for our sins, and not for ours only but also for the sins of the whole world.”

The term hilasmos encompasses several key theological concepts related to Christ’s atoning work. It includes propitiation (the satisfaction of divine wrath against sin), expiation (the removal of sin’s guilt and defilement), and reconciliation (the restoration of relationship between God and humanity). These concepts address both the reality of evil and God’s response to it through redemptive action.

The theological significance of Christ’s atonement for theodicy lies in its demonstration that God has not merely permitted evil but has personally absorbed its full consequences. The cross reveals that God’s response to evil is not philosophical explanation but sacrificial action. Rather than explaining why evil exists, God enters into evil’s reality and overcomes it through His own suffering and death.

The substitutionary aspect of Christ’s atonement addresses the justice dimension of the problem of evil. Sin and evil cannot simply be ignored or dismissed without compromising divine justice. The cross demonstrates that God’s forgiveness and mercy are not arbitrary but are grounded in the satisfaction of divine justice through Christ’s sacrifice. Romans 3:25-26 explains: “whom God put forward as a propitiation by his blood, to be received by faith. This was to show God’s righteousness, because in his divine forbearance he had passed over former sins. It was to show his righteousness at the present time, so that he might be just and the justifier of the one who has faith in Jesus.”

The victory aspect of Christ’s atonement addresses the power dimension of the problem of evil. The cross and resurrection demonstrate God’s ultimate triumph over evil, sin, and death. Colossians 2:15 declares: “He disarmed the rulers and authorities and put them to open shame, by triumphing over them in him.” This victory is both accomplished (through Christ’s historical work) and eschatological (to be fully realized in the future).

The Mysterion of Divine Wisdom

The Christian approach to the problem of evil acknowledges that it ultimately involves mysterion (mystery) rather than complete rational resolution. This is not an appeal to irrationality or contradiction but rather a recognition of the limitations of finite human understanding when confronted with the infinite wisdom of God. The mystery is not that God’s ways are irrational but that they transcend human comprehension.

Paul’s discussion in Romans 11:33-36 exemplifies this approach: “Oh, the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways! For who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor? Or who has given a gift to him that he might be repaid? For from him and through him and to him are all things. To him be glory forever. Amen.” This passage acknowledges the limitations of human understanding while affirming the perfect wisdom and justice of God’s ways.

The concept of mysterion in Christian theology does not represent an abandonment of reason but rather its proper limitation. Human reason, though genuine and valuable, is finite and fallen, making it incapable of fully comprehending the infinite wisdom of God. The mystery of evil’s existence within God’s sovereign plan is not a logical contradiction but rather a truth that exceeds human capacity for complete understanding.

Job’s experience provides the paradigmatic biblical example of this approach to the problem of evil. Throughout his suffering, Job maintains both his faith in God’s justice and his protest against apparent injustice. God’s response from the whirlwind (Job 38-41) does not provide a philosophical explanation for Job’s suffering but rather overwhelms him with a vision of divine wisdom and power that transcends human understanding. Job’s final response acknowledges the limitation of his perspective: “I know that you can do all things, and that no purpose of yours can be thwarted… Therefore I have uttered what I did not understand, things too wonderful for me, which I did not know” (Job 42:2-3).

The theological balance between reason and mystery in addressing evil maintains both the intelligibility of faith and the transcendence of God. Christian theodicy provides genuine insights into the compatibility of God’s existence with evil’s reality, but it does not claim to offer exhaustive explanation. The ultimate resolution lies not in complete intellectual comprehension but in trust in God’s character as revealed in Christ.

Conclusion: The Triune, Sovereign, and Relational God

The comprehensive examination of the question “Who is God?” reveals the magnificent complexity and profound unity of Christian theology’s understanding of the divine nature. God is revealed in Scripture as the self-existent, infinite ens perfectissimum whose aseitas and immutabilitas establish His absolute transcendence over creation while His triune nature as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit grounds His relational esse in eternal perichoresis. The classical attributa divina—omnipotence, omniscience, and holiness—find their unity in divine simplicitas, while philosophical arguments from Anselm’s ontological proof to Aquinas’s quinque viae demonstrate reason’s capacity to discern God’s existence from the created order.

The theological disputes examined—from ancient challenges like pantheism, deism, modalism, and tritheism to contemporary debates involving open theism and process theology—serve to sharpen and clarify orthodox understanding while demonstrating both the sophistication of Christian theology and its commitment to biblical fidelity. Barth’s emphasis on God as ganz Anders preserves divine transcendence against anthropomorphic reduction, while Christ’s hypostasis as revealed in Hebrews 1:3 ensures that the transcendent God remains genuinely knowable through His incarnate self-disclosure.

The problem of evil, though presenting genuine intellectual and existential challenges, finds its ultimate resolution not in philosophical theodicy alone but in the christological hilasmos that demonstrates God’s personal engagement with evil through sacrificial love. The mysterion that surrounds divine wisdom does not represent irrationality but rather the appropriate humility of finite understanding before infinite truth.

This synthesis aligns decisively with a first-century, non-denominational, New Testament Protestant Christian perspective that centers on Christ as the definitive revelation of God’s nature and character. John 1:1-14 establishes the theological framework: the eternal Word who was with God and was God became flesh to reveal the Father’s glory, full of grace and truth. In Christ, the invisible God becomes visible (Colossians 1:15), the transcendent becomes immanent, and the infinite becomes personally knowable without ceasing to be infinite.

The God revealed in Christian Scripture is neither the impersonal absolute of philosophical speculation nor the anthropomorphic deity of human projection, but the living, triune God who exists in perfect relational communion within His own being and who has chosen to extend that communion to His creatures through the redemptive work of Christ. This God is simultaneously wholly other in His transcendent majesty and intimately near in His covenantal faithfulness, perfectly just in His hatred of evil and perfectly merciful in His provision of atonement, absolutely sovereign in His governance of all things and genuinely relational in His love for His people.

The ultimate answer to “Who is God?” therefore cannot be separated from the revelation of Jesus Christ, through whom we know the Father and receive the Holy Spirit. God is the triune Creator and Redeemer who has revealed Himself definitively in His incarnate Son, making possible both authentic knowledge of His nature and personal relationship with His people. In Christ, all the perfections of deity—aseitas, immutabilitas, omnipotence, omniscience, holiness, and love—find their perfect expression and their redemptive application to fallen creation. Thus, to know who God is, we must look to Christ, in whom “the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily” (Colossians 2:9) and through whom we have access to the Father by the Spirit in the unity of the triune God.

Bibliography

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Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947.

Augustine of Hippo. Confessions. Translated by R.S. Pine-Coffin. London: Penguin Classics, 1961.

Augustine of Hippo. De Trinitate. Translated by Edmund Hill. Brooklyn: New City Press, 1991.

Augustine of Hippo. The City of God. Translated by Marcus Dods. New York: Modern Library, 1950.

Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1936-1977.

Barth, Karl. The Epistle to the Romans. Translated by Edwyn Hoskyns. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933.

Bavinck, Hermann. Reformed Dogmatics. 4 vols. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003-2008.

Boyd, Gregory A. God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God. Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2000.

Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Translated by Ford Lewis Battles. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960.

Feser, Edward. Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. Heusenstamm: Editiones Scholasticae, 2014.

Hartshorne, Charles. The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948.

John of Damascus. An Exposition of the Orthodox Faith. Translated by S.D.F. Salmond. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 9. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1899.

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan, 1929.

Otto, Rudolf. The Idea of the Holy. Translated by John W. Harvey. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923.

Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics. Translated by Edwin Curley. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.

Voltaire. Philosophical Dictionary. Translated by Theodore Besterman. London: Penguin Classics, 1972.

Westminster Confession of Faith. Glasgow: Free Presbyterian Publications, 1967.

Westminster Shorter Catechism. Glasgow: Free Presbyterian Publications, 1967.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and Reality. New York: Free Press, 1978.

Footnotes

¹ Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 4, a. 1.

² Ibid., I, q. 4, a. 1.

³ Westminster Confession of Faith, 2.1.

⁴ John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 1.10.2.

⁵ Hermann Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:98.

⁶ Augustine, Confessions, 11.13.

⁷ Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 9, a. 1.

⁸ Westminster Shorter Catechism, Q. 4.

⁹ Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, 20.

¹⁰ The Nicene Creed, 325 AD.

¹¹ Athanasius, Against the Arians, 2.70.

¹² John of Damascus, Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, 1.14.

¹³ Augustine, De Trinitate, 5.5.6.

¹⁴ Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 25, a. 3.

¹⁵ Calvin, Institutes, 3.21.5.

¹⁶ Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 3.

¹⁷ Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature?, 1.

¹⁸ Edward Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics, 252.

¹⁹ Anselm, Proslogion, ch. 2.

²⁰ Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A598/B626.

²¹ Calvin, Institutes, 1.3.1.

²² Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Definition 6.

²³ Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, “God.”

²⁴ Westminster Confession, 5.1.

²⁵ Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, 330.

²⁶ Calvin, Institutes, 1.13.1.

²⁷ Gregory Boyd, God of the Possible, 15.

²⁸ Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, 343.

²⁹ Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, 142.

³⁰ Epicurus, quoted in Lactantius, On the Anger of God, 13.20-21.

³¹ Augustine, City of God, 11.18.

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God, Divine, Trinity, Trinitarian, Theology, Theological, Christ, Christological, Scripture, Biblical, Immutability, Omnipotence, Holiness, Atonement, Evil, Revelation